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A Note on Schumpeterian Competition in the Creative Class 
and Innovation Policy 
Abstract 
 We study innovation policy in a region in which the members of the creative class engage 
in Schumpeterian competition and thereby extend aspects of the recent analysis in Batabyal and 
Yoo (2017). Using the language of these researchers, the creative class is broadly composed of 
existing and candidate entrepreneurs. In contrast to these researchers, we suppose that R&D by 
candidate entrepreneurs does not generate any negative externalities. In this setting, we analyze 
the impact that taxes and subsidies on R&D by existing and candidate entrepreneurs have on 
R&D expenditures and regional economic growth.  
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1. Introduction 
 We begin with the definitions of two concepts---the creative class and creative capital---
that are now very familiar to and much studied by both regional scientists and urban economists. 
Richard Florida (2002, p. 68) helpfully explains that the creative class “consists of people who 
add economic value through their creativity.” This class is made up of professionals such as 
doctors, lawyers, scientists, engineers, university professors, and, notably, bohemians such as 
artists, musicians, and sculptors. From the standpoint of regional economic growth and 
development, these people are significant because they possess creative capital which is the 
“intrinsically human ability to create new ideas, new technologies, new business models, new 
cultural forms, and whole new industries that really [matter]” (Florida, 2005, p. 32). 
Several researchers have now documented the salience of the creative class in promoting 
regional economic growth and development. In a recent paper, Batabyal and Yoo (2017) 
(hereafter B&Y) summarize the literature on the creative class and make three salient points. 
First, B&Y note that in regions where the creative class is a dominant part of the overall 
workforce, there is a clear link between innovations, the creative class, and regional economic 
growth and development. Second, B&Y contend that innovative activities and processes are 
essentially competitive in nature and that this competitive aspect is related to the insight of 
Joseph Schumpeter who argued that growth processes are marked by creative destruction in 
which “economic growth is driven, at least in part, by new firms replacing incumbents and new 
machines and products replacing old ones” (Acemoglu, 2009, p. 458). Finally, B&Y point out 
that the preceding two points notwithstanding, there are no theoretical studies that examine how 
Schumpeterian competition between the members of a region’s creative class affects both 
innovation policy and economic growth in this region.  
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Given this state of affairs, B&Y provide what they claim is the first theoretical analysis of 
the ways in which Schumpeterian competition in the creative class affects innovation policy and 
economic growth in a region that is creative in the sense of Richard Florida. B&Y broadly divide 
the creative class they study into existing and candidate entrepreneurs. A key assumption made 
by B&Y in their analysis is that negative externalities accompany the R&D undertaken by the 
candidate entrepreneurs. The justification for this assumption is the idea that when many 
candidate entrepreneurs are competitively attempting to come up with quality improvements in 
the inputs called machines that are used to produce a final consumption good such as a camera, 
diminishing returns are likely to exist. This notwithstanding, we contend that R&D by the 
candidate entrepreneurs may but does not have to be accompanied by the presence of negative 
externalities.  
As such, our central objective in this note is to first suppose that R&D by the candidate 
entrepreneurs does not generate any negative externalities and to then study the impact that taxes 
and subsidies on R&D by the existing and the candidate entrepreneurs have on R&D 
expenditures and economic growth in a creative region. In the course of our analysis, we shall 
make use of the basic point that a subsidy can be thought of as a negative tax and that a tax can 
be thought of as a negative subsidy. The remainder of this note is arranged as follows. Section 2 
describes the model employed by B&Y. Section 3 highlights the ways in which the balanced 
growth path (BGP) equilibrium with taxes and subsidies studied by B&Y changes when the 
R&D conducted by the candidate entrepreneurs generates no negative externalities. Section 4 
studies how the comparative statics results about the effects of taxes and subsidies on R&D and 
economic growth obtained by B&Y change when, once again, no negative externalities arise 
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from the R&D conducted by the candidate entrepreneurs. Section 5 concludes and then offers 
two suggestions for extending the research delineated in this note. 
2. The Model 
2.1. Preliminaries 
 Consider an infinite horizon, continuous-time, stylized region that is creative in the sense 
of Richard Florida. The representative creative class household in this region displays constant 
relative risk aversion (CRRA) and its CRRA utility function is denoted by 
׬ expሺെߩݐሻ ሾሼܥሺݐሻଵିఏஶ଴ -1}/(1-ߠሻሿ݀ݐ, ߠ ് 1, where ܥሺݐሻ is consumption at time ݐ, ߩ ൐ 0 is the 
constant time discount rate, and ߠ ൒ 0 is the constant coefficient of relative risk aversion. At any 
time ݐ, members of the creative class possess creative capital and we denote each member and 
her creative capital by ܴሺݐሻ. The population of the creative class is constant and therefore we 
have ܴሺݐሻ ൌ ܴ, ∀ݐ. The existing creative capital is supplied inelastically.  
 The aggregate resource constraint at time ݐ is given by 
ܥሺݐሻ ൅ ܺሺݐሻ ൅ ܫሺݐሻ ൑ ܱሺݐሻ,      (1) 
where ܥሺݐሻ is consumption, ܺሺݐሻ is total spending on machines, ܫሺݐሻ is total spending on R&D, 
and ܱሺݐሻ is the output and the value of the single final consumption good such as a camera. The 
machines we have just referred to are essential inputs in the production of the final good.  
 There is a continuum of machines that is used to produce the final good ܱሺݐሻ. Each 
machine line or variety is described by ߥ where ߥ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ. The source of economic growth in our 
creative region is process innovations that improve the quality of existing machines. To this end, 
let ݍሺߥ, ݐሻ denote the quality of the machine of line or variety ߥ at time ݐ.  
 The single final good or ܱሺݐሻ is produced in accordance with the function  
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ܱሺݐሻ ൌ ଵଵିఉ ሾ׬ ݍሺߥ, ݐሻఉݔሺߥ, ݐ; ݍሻଵିఉ
ଵ
଴ ݀ߥሿܴఉ,    (2) 
 
where ܴ is creative capital, ݍሺߥ, ݐሻ is the quality of the machine of line ߥ at time ݐ, ݔሺߥ, ݐ; ݍሻ is 
the total amount of the machine of variety ߥ and quality ݍ that is used at time ݐ, and ߚ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ is 
a parameter. Let ݓ ൐ 0 denote the wage rate or the return to the creative capital input ܴ and let 
ݎ ൐ 0 denote the interest rate.  
 The quality improvements in the machines that arise from the process innovations 
mentioned above are the outcome of two types of innovations. The first type of innovation is 
performed by members of the creative class known as existing entrepreneurs. These are the 
individuals who have already invented and produced machines that are presently being used to 
produce the final consumption good. The second type of innovation is performed by the 
members of the creative class known as candidate entrepreneurs. These are the individuals who 
are seeking to invent and produce higher qualities of machine lines than the ones that are 
presently being used to produce the final good. The basic feature of the model employed by 
B&Y is the Schumpeterian competition between the existing and the candidate entrepreneurs. 
This competition is Schumpeterian because for any machine line ߥ, when a candidate 
entrepreneur develops a machine of higher quality than the quality that is presently in use to 
produce the final good, the candidate entrepreneur’s higher quality machine creatively destroys 
an existing entrepreneur’s now lower quality machine. Next, let us comprehend the R&D process 
that gives rise to the invention and production of higher quality machines.  
2.2. The ontogenesis of quality machines 
 Let ݍሺߥ, ݐሻ denote the quality of machine line ߥ at time ݐ. The “quality ladder” for each 
machine variety is of the form 
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ݍሺߥ, ݐሻ ൌ ߜ௡ݍሺߥ, ݏሻ, ∀ߥ	ܽ݊݀	ݐ,     (3) 
where ߜ ൐ 1 is the “ladder” with rungs and ݊ denotes the number of marginal innovations on 
this machine line---or the number of rungs climbed up the ladder---in the time period between 
ݏ ൑ ݐ and ݐ. Here, ݏ is the time at which this particular type of machine technology was first 
invented and ݍሺߥ, ݏሻ is its quality at that point in time. An existing entrepreneur has a fully 
enforced patent on the machines that she has developed. Even so, this patent leaves open the 
possibility that a candidate entrepreneur will engage in R&D and “jump over” an existing 
entrepreneur’s machine quality. At time ݐ ൌ 0, each machine line begins with some quality 
ݍሺߥ, 0ሻ ൐ 0 and this line is owned by an existing entrepreneur. Marginal innovations can only be 
brought about by an existing entrepreneur. If an existing entrepreneur engages in R&D and 
spends an amount ݅ாሺߥ, ݐሻݍሺߥ, ݐሻ of the final consumption good for a marginal innovation on a 
machine of quality ݍሺߥ, ݐሻ then this existing entrepreneur gives rise to the flow rate of innovation 
߶ሺ݅ாሻ݅ாሺߥ, ݐሻ where ߶ᇱሺ݅ாሻ ൐ 0, 	߶ᇱᇱሺ݅ாሻ ൏ 0 and this flow rate function ߶ሺ∙ሻ satisfies the 
conditions ݈݅݉௜ಶ→଴߶ᇱሺ݅ாሻ ൌ ∞ and ݈݅݉௜ಶ→ஶ߶ᇱሺ݅ாሻ ൌ 0. The result of this R&D and expenditure 
by an existing entrepreneur is a new machine of quality ߜݍሺߥ, ݐሻ.  
 Candidate entrepreneurs can also conduct R&D with the aim of producing quality 
machines that will improve upon the presently used machines of line ߥ at time ݐ. Assume that the 
current quality of a machine of line ߥ is ݍሺߥ, ݐሻ. Then, by spending one unit of the final 
consumption good, a candidate entrepreneur can innovate at the flow rate ߟሼ݅஼ሺߥ, ݐሻሽ ݍሺߥ, ݐሻ⁄  
where ߟᇱሼ∙ሽ ൏ 0 and ݅஼ሺߥ, ݐሻ is the R&D expenditure incurred by the candidate entrepreneur on 
machine line ߥ at time ݐ. For machine line ߥ, a quality innovation by a candidate entrepreneur 
that jumps over an existing quality is a drastic innovation and a drastic quality innovation 
creatively destroys the existing quality machine of line ߥ. Whereas candidate entrepreneurs give 
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rise to drastic innovations only, existing entrepreneurs can give rise to marginal and to drastic 
innovations. However, even though existing entrepreneurs can give rise to both kinds of 
innovation, in practice, they only generate marginal innovations.4  
 The key point to note is the B&Y assumption that the ߟሼ∙ሽ function is strictly decreasing. 
This assumption captures the idea that the competitively undertaken R&D by the candidate 
entrepreneurs is subject to diminishing returns and hence leads to negative externalities. This is 
the assumption that we dispense with in section 4 by supposing that ߟሼ݅஼ሽ ൌ ߟ,෥  where ߟ෤ is a 
positive constant. Also, note that the candidate entrepreneurs treat the ߟሼ∙ሽ function as exogenous 
to their decision-making. The ߟሼ∙ሽ function for the candidate entrepreneurs satisfies the 
conditions ݈݅݉௜಴→ஶߟሼ݅஼ሽ ൌ 0 and ݈݅݉௜಴→଴ߟሼ݅஼ሽ ൌ ∞. Finally, a quality innovation by a 
candidate entrepreneur leads to a new machine of quality ߯ݍሺߥ, ݐሻ where ߯ ൐ ߜ. Put differently, 
quality innovations by candidate entrepreneurs are more drastic than those undertaken by the 
existing entrepreneurs. 
 Once a specific machine of quality ݍሺߥ, ݐሻ has been invented, any amount of this machine 
can be produced at the marginal cost ߰ in terms of the final good and, in the remainder of this 
note, we shall use the normalization ߰ ൌ 1 െ ߚ. Observe that the total spending on R&D or ܫሺݐሻ 
in (1) can also be expressed as  
ܫሺݐሻ ൌ ׬ ሼ݅ாሺߥ, ݐሻ ൅ ݅஼ሺߥ, ݐሻሽݍሺߥ, ݐሻ݀ߥଵ଴ ,    (4) 
where ݍሺߥ, ݐሻ refers to the highest quality of machine variety ߥ at time ݐ.  
 In our creative region, a so called allocation has four parts. First, there are the time paths 
of consumption, total spending on machines, and total spending on R&D given by 
                                                            
4  
This is because of a phenomenon known as Arrow’s (1962) replacement effect. See Acemoglu (2009, pp. 420-422) and Batabyal 
and Yoo (2017) for additional details.  
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ሼܥሺݐሻ, ܺሺݐሻ, ܫሺݐሻሽ௧ୀ଴ஶ . Second, we have the time paths of the R&D expenditures by the existing 
and the candidate entrepreneurs denoted by ሼ݅ாሺߥ, ݐሻ, ݅஼ሺߥ, ݐሻሽఔ∈ሾ଴,ଵሿ,௧ୀ଴ஶ . Third, there are the 
prices and the quantities of the highest quality machines and the net present discounted value of 
profits from these same machines given by ሼ݌௫ሺߥ, ݐ; ݍሻ, ݔሺߥ, ݐ; ݍሻ, ܸሺߥ, ݐ; ݍሻሽఔ∈ሾ଴,ଵሿ,௧ୀ଴ஶ . Finally, 
there are the time paths of the interest and the wage rates denoted by ሼݎሺݐሻ, ݓሺݐሻሽ௧ୀ଴ஶ .  
An equilibrium allocation is one in which four properties are satisfied concurrently. First, 
the candidate entrepreneurs make R&D decisions to maximize their present discounted value. 
Second, the existing entrepreneurs choose machine prices and quantities and make R&D 
decisions to maximize their present discounted value. Third, the representative creative class 
household chooses consumption to maximize utility. Finally, all markets clear. It is understood 
that a balanced growth path (BGP) is an equilibrium time path on which both consumption and 
the output of the final good grow at a constant rate. 
Now, with this description of the model in place, our next task is to delineate the ways in 
which taxes and subsidies on R&D by the existing and the candidate entrepreneurs influence 
R&D expenditures and regional economic growth with the assumption that the R&D conducted 
by the candidate entrepreneurs does not generate negative externalities. While performing this 
exercise, we follow B&Y and adapt some of the results in Peters and Simsek (2009, pp. 275-284) 
to our analysis of Schumpeterian competition in the creative class that broadly consists of 
existing and candidate entrepreneurs. 
3. The BGP Equilibrium with no Negative Externalities 
 Suppose that an apposite regional authority (RA) levies taxes on the R&D expenditures 
undertaken by the existing and the candidate entrepreneurs. Denote these two taxes by ߬ா and ߬஼ 
respectively. B&Y show that in the presence of these two taxes, a unique BGP equilibrium exists 
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in our creative region and that this equilibrium satisfies three properties. First, the output of the 
final good ሺܱሻ, consumption by the representative creative class household ሺܥሻ, total R&D 
expenditures ሺܫሻ, and the average total quality of machines ሺܳሻ, all grow at a constant rate. 
Second, the value function is explicitly a function of machine quality ݍ and it has the linear form 
ܸሺݍሻ ൌ ߱ݍ. Finally, R&D expenditures by the existing and the candidate entrepreneurs	ሺ݅ா∗, ݅஼) 
are positive. We now demonstrate how the BGP equilibrium studied by B&Y changes when 
R&D conducted by the candidate entrepreneurs does not generate negative externalities or when 
ߟሼ݅஼ሽ ൌ ߟ,෥  a constant. 
Modifying equations (34), (35), and (37) in B&Y, we get 
ሺߜ െ 1ሻ߶ᇱሺ݅ா∗ሻ߱ሺݐሻ ൌ 1 ൅ ߬ா,	     (5) 
߯ߟ෤߱ሺݐሻ ൌ 1 ൅ ߬஼,       (6) 
and 
 
߱ሺݐሻ ൌ ߱ ൌ ఉோି௜ಶ∗ሺଵାఛಶሻ௥ಳಸುିሺఋିଵሻథሺ௜ಶ∗ሻା௜಴ఎ෥,     (7) 
 
where ݎ஻ீ௉ denotes the interest rate in the BGP equilibrium. The BGP equilibrium growth rate of 
the economy of our creative region is now given by modifying equation (27) in B&Y. This gives 
us 
݃஻ீ௉ ൌ ሺߜ െ 1ሻ߶ሺ݅ா∗ሻ ൅ ሺ߯ െ 1ሻ݅஼ߟ෤.     (8) 
 We now want to ascertain the equilibrium R&D expenditures by the existing and the 
candidate entrepreneurs or ሺ݅ா∗, ݅஼ሻ. To this end, let us use (6) to eliminate one equation from the 
system of equations given by (5), (6), and (7). We get  
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ሺߜ െ 1ሻ߶ᇱሺ݅ா∗ሻ ቀଵାఛ಴ఞఎ෥ ቁ ൌ 1 ൅ ߬ா,	     (9) 
and 
 
߱ ൌ ቀଵାఛ಴ఞఎ෥ ቁ ൌ
ఉோି௜ಶ∗ሺଵାఛಶሻ
ሼఏሺఞିଵሻାଵሽ௜಴ఎ෥ାሺఏିଵሻሺఋିଵሻథሺ௜ಶ∗ሻାఘ,   (10) 
 
where we have substituted for ݃஻ீ௉ from (8) in the representative creative class household’s so 
called Euler equation---see equation (24) in B&Y---to obtain the denominator in the right-hand-
side (RHS) of equation (10).  
Equations (9) and (10) give us a system of two equations that can be solved to obtain the 
two unknowns ݅ா∗ and ݅஼. In this regard, note that we can solve equation (9) directly for ݅ா∗or the 
equilibrium spending on R&D by the existing entrepreneurs. This is because inspection of (9) 
reveals that this equation gives us ݅ா∗ as a function of exogenous parameters only. Once we have 
obtained the equilibrium value of ݅ா∗, we can substitute this value in equation (10) to give us the 
equilibrium value of ݅஼ or the optimal value of the spending on R&D by the candidate 
entrepreneurs.  
We conclude this section with two observations. First, the main impact of the ߟሼ݅஼ሽ ൌ ߟ෤ 
assumption is to simplify some of the mathematical analysis conducted by B&Y. Second, when 
the R&D of the candidate entrepreneurs generates no negative externalities, the BGP equilibrium 
values of ݅ா∗ and ݅஼ are both different from the values obtained by B&Y and easier to solve for. 
We now proceed to study how the comparative statics results about the effects of taxes and 
subsidies on R&D spending and economic growth obtained by B&Y change when there are no 
negative externalities from the R&D conducted by the candidate entrepreneurs. 
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4. Comparative Statics with Taxes and Subsidies 
 Recall that the taxes on R&D spending by the existing and the candidate entrepreneurs 
are denoted by ߬ா and ߬஼ respectively. Now, let us first consider the impact of these two taxes on 
the R&D spending of the existing entrepreneurs. B&Y show that a tax on R&D by the existing 
(candidate) entrepreneurs lowers (raises) the amount of R&D they conduct. To see what happens 
when ߟሼ݅஼ሽ ൌ ߟ,෥  we work with equation (9). Totally differentiating this equation and then 
simplifying the resulting expression, we get 
 
ௗ௜ಶ∗
ௗఛಶ ൌ ቄ
ఞఎ෥
ଵାఛ಴ቅ ቄ
ଵ
ሺఋିଵሻథᇱᇱሺ௜ಶ∗ሻቅ ൏ 0     (11) 
 
and 
 
ௗ௜ಶ∗
ௗఛ಴ ൌ െ ቄ
ଵ
ଵାఛ಴ቅ ቄ
థᇲ൫௜ಶ∗൯
థᇲᇲሺ௜ಶ∗ሻቅ ൐ 0.     (12) 
 
Comparing (11) and (12) with the previously stated result obtained by B&Y, we see that the 
absence of negative externalities does not change the impact that these two taxes have on the 
R&D spending of the existing entrepreneurs. Specifically, in both the B&Y paper and in the 
present note, R&D spending by the existing entrepreneurs goes down when the R&D tax is 
imposed on them and it goes up when the R&D tax is imposed on the candidate entrepreneurs.  
 Let us now analyze the impact of the two taxes on the R&D spending undertaken by the 
candidate entrepreneurs. To this end, suppose ߬஼ increases by a small amount. Then (10) tells us 
that ݅ா∗ goes up. However, when ݅ா∗ goes up, (10) tells us that for a given value of ݅஼, the left-
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hand-side (LHS) of this equation rises and the RHS falls. This means that in order to satisfy (10), 
݅஼ must go down. Therefore, we get 
 
ௗ௜಴
ௗఛ಴ ൏ 0.       (13) 
 
To determine the impact that the tax ߬ா has on R&D spending ݅஼, observe that equation 
(10) can be simplified to give us 
߱ሾሼߠሺ߯ െ 1ሻ ൅ 1ሽߟ෤݀݅஼ ൅ ሺߜ െ 1ሻሺߠ െ 1ሻ߶ᇱሺ݅ா∗ሻ݀݅ா∗ሿ ൌ െሺ1 ൅ ߬ாሻ݀݅ா∗ െ ݅ா∗݀߬ா.  (14) 
We now substitute equations (9), (11), and (12) in the above equation. After several steps of 
algebra, we get  
 
߱ሼߠሺ߯ െ 1ሻ ൅ 1ሽߟ෤݀݅஼ ൌ െቄ݅ா∗ ൅ ఏథᇲ൫௜ಶ∗൯థᇲᇲሺ௜ಶ∗ሻ ቅ ݀߬ா.    (15) 
 
It is not possible to sign the expression in the curly brackets on the RHS of (15) without making 
further assumptions about the flow rate of innovation function ߶ሺ∙ሻ. Therefore, as in B&Y, once 
again, the impact of the tax ߬ா on R&D spending by the candidate entrepreneurs is ambiguous. 
In symbols, we have  
 
ௗ௜಴
ௗఛಶ ≷ 0.       (16) 
 
 Comparing (13) and (16) with equations (43) and (47) in B&Y, we see that the B&Y 
results are unchanged. In other words, whether or not the R&D undertaken by the candidate 
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entrepreneurs generates negative externalities, R&D spending by the candidate entrepreneurs 
goes down when the R&D tax is imposed on them and there is an ambiguous impact on this same 
R&D spending when the tax is imposed on the existing entrepreneurs.  
Now note that if ߬ா or ߬஼ is the tax imposed on the R&D spending of either the existing 
or the candidate entrepreneurs then we can interpret െ߬ா or െ߬஼ as the corresponding subsidy 
given either to the existing or to the candidate entrepreneurs. This means that a small increase in 
the tax ߬ா or ߬஼ is equivalent to a small decrease in the subsidy െ߬ா or െ߬஼. So, looked at from 
the standpoint of a subsidy, the comparative statics results in (11) and (12) tell us that an increase 
in the subsidy െ߬ா	ሺെ߬஼ሻ on R&D spending undertaken by the existing entrepreneurs raises 
(lowers) their R&D. Next, consider the R&D undertaken by the candidate entrepreneurs. Now, 
the results in (13) and (16) are of interest. Once again, looking at the comparative statics impacts 
from the perspective of a subsidy, (13) tells us that an increase in the subsidy െ߬஼ raises the 
R&D undertaken by the candidate entrepreneurs and an increase in the subsidy െ߬ா has an 
ambiguous impact on the R&D undertaken by the same candidate entrepreneurs. In sum, whether 
or not the R&D conducted by the candidate entrepreneurs generates negative externalities, the 
comparative statics results involving the two taxes and the subsidies obtained by B&Y do not 
change.  
Since the comparative statics results with the two taxes and the subsidies are the same as 
those obtained by B&Y, intuitively speaking, it follows that the impact of the two taxes on the 
growth rate of the economy of our creative region in the BGP equilibrium ሺ݃஻ீ௉ሻ is also 
unchanged. Specifically, using the methodology of B&Y, it can be shown that a tax on the R&D 
performed by the candidate entrepreneurs has an ambiguous impact on ݃஻ீ௉ but a tax on the 
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R&D of existing entrepreneurs lowers ݃஻ீ௉. This concludes our analysis of Schumpeterian 
competition in the creative class and innovation policy.  
5. Conclusions 
 In this note, we studied innovation policy in a region in which the members of the 
creative class engaged in Schumpeterian competition and thereby extended aspects of the recent 
analysis in Batabyal and Yoo (2017). Using the language of these researchers, the creative class 
was broadly composed of existing and candidate entrepreneurs. In contrast to these researchers, 
we supposed that the R&D conducted by the candidate entrepreneurs did not generate any 
negative externalities. In this setting, we analyzed the impact that taxes and subsidies on R&D by 
the existing and the candidate entrepreneurs had on R&D expenditures and regional economic 
growth. 
 The analysis in this note can be extended in a number of different directions. Here are 
two suggestions for extending the research described here. First, one could analyze a social 
planner’s problem in which the planner maximizes the utility of the representative creative class 
household. The objective here would be to shed light on the temporal behavior of this 
household’s optimal consumption. Second, it would also be useful to analyze whether there are 
circumstances in which a social planner selects a higher growth rate than the rate that arises in a 
BGP equilibrium. Studies that integrate these aspects of the problem into the analysis will 
increase our understanding of the connections between Schumpeterian competition in a region’s 
creative class and economic growth in this same region.  
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